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While a prolonged period of peace has multitudinous advantages,
it has nevertheless one little defect. It obliterates all knowledge of
prize law, and especially all knowledge of prize procedure. It is
nbt credible that any lawyer or any merchant who had lived through
the Napoleonic period would have accepted such a list of contraband
as seems now to be considered normal; or would have seen nothing
strange in the suggestion that contraband was whatever a belligerent
saw fit to declare such. Nor would the men who had heard Sir
William Scott proclaim that the principles of blockade were not to
be subverted because in some particular case they would detract from
a blockade's efficiency,1 feel apprehensive that they would be subverted
because of the introduction of railways. The neutral merchant who
heard of the Imina Baumann2 knew that the sovereign rights of the
neutral port were superior to the momentary exigencies of the hardest-
pressed belligerent state.
But Peace comes, and we forget. Sixty years after the Imina
Baumann' Chief Justice Chase .unlocked the floodgates of belligerent
pretensions, and did away with the security of the neutral port. Not
on any calculated desire to restore the balance disturbed by railways,
be it noted, for railways were scarcely in question, but simply on
grounds of belligerent advantage. A hundred years after the French
admiral Allemand stayed his destructive hand when he met neutral
American and Swedish merchantmen, the neutral flag was sent to the
bottom in the East by the Russian and in the West by the German.
We very easily forget.
And it is very easy to forget procedure. It is the peculiar preserve
of a few-a very few-lawyers and court officials, mostly of advanced
years. Sailors and officers may know something of it, but the public
knows nothing and cares less. By the time of the next war a new
generation of lawyers has arisen, whose knowledge and, interest is
precisely that of the public. Text-books deal mainly with substantive
law. Procedure has to be disinterred from musty books. And very
'The Ocean (iS8oi) 3 C. Rob. 297; The Luna (i8Io) Edw. Adm. i9o; ,The
Stert (i8ox) 4 C. Rob. 65.
23 C. Rob. 167.
t This case is usually, and apparently improperly, cited as The Imina. The
master's name was Vroom (see Contents of 3 C. Rob.), and Baumann was seem-
ingly part of the ship's name. This kind of mistake is often made; thus Rothery,
Prize Droits, followed by Evans, P, in The Roumanian, speaks of "The Berlin
.Tohannes"-really The Berlin, Johannes Poort, master.
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often these neglect the obvious. Fundamental rules are assumed to
be too well known to need express statement.
Some such fundamental rules of prize, law have been completely
forgotten in the course of recent discussions, the learned and honor-
able disputants having apparently no inkling of the fact of their
existence. They fail to appreciate the fact that the forcible seizure
of a vessel under a friendly flag is and ever was an extremely serious
thing, and they regard it with much the same leniency as an arrest
by a policeman-a thing to be scrutinized certainly, but not a thing
intolerable except when unjustified on the clearest grounds. The
honor of the flag, a thing for which the Chesapeake's men died, has
become to them a name. They have forgotten the fundamentals of
prize law: those principles which secured the freedom of the neutral
flag from invasion when hoisted on a ship of its nationality.
Ships were never "searched" at sea. If there is one thing of which
the sciolist is more convinced than another, it is that "in the old days"
the "small ship" of the period was regularly searched, in the sense
of her cargo's being "rummaged," at sea. It is a complete fallacy.
Ships never were so rummaged or searched as a preliminary to deten-
tion. The first principle of prize law, American, French, and English
alike, was the imperative command--"A captor shall not break bulk."
And without breaking -bulk how is rummaging possible?
The cause of the mistake is a careless misinterpretation of the word
"search." With their minds full of municipal law and the searches
effected by custom house officers and police constables, modern
publicists have rashly concluded that the search implied in the expres-
sion "visit arid search," meant a general overhauling of the cargo.
It did not.
The modem ship, the sciolist thinks, is too big to be properly
rummaged at sea. So she must be brought into port and rummaged,
before any liability for detaining her arises or can arise. On the con-
trary, she is in scarcely the same situation kis the old small vessels. The
boarding officer must make up his mind without tampering with the
cargo whether he is going to make a case of it or not. There is no
more difficulty in looking over a liner's papers than a schooner's.
If, and only if, they raise a case for inquiry, is the officer entitled to
bring the vessel into port and ask the court to look at the cargo.
"Before the captain of the Nonsuch left the Anna Maria, in pursuit
of other objects, he ought to have decided either to seize her as prize
or to restore her."4
'The Anna Maria (1817) 2 Wheat. 327, 334. In this case Marshall remarks
obiter that a captain is entitled to do all that is necessary, and no more than is
necessary, to enable him to establish the vessel's character and voyage This
statement must be completed by adding the words, "by the proper and legal
evidence." In the case before him, the captors had made a violent search of two
hours' duration for papers, breaking open trunks and the like, but without, so far
as appears, laying a finger upon the cargo. Their violence and other misconduct
resulted in a decree being made against them for damages.
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Before one barrel can be broached, the responsibility must be taken
and the risk run of instituting legal proceedings. It is no gallant
captain, but the officer of the court, acting under a judicial commis-
sion as a step in the legal process, who effects the physical search.
The proceeding, technicallr known as a "commission of unlivery,"
forms with the return to it part of the material in the cause.
Sir John Marriott, in the pamphlet to which reference will presently
be made, refers to another possibility, which he does not particularize-
search "in certain special cases in the presence of public officials."5
What he alludes to is uncertain, but certainly not a search at sea
"Although there was the strongest reason to think that by unloading
there might be found the real ship's papers of the Henrick & Alide,
and m.ore contraband in boxes and barrels, not set down in the bills
of lading and papers produced, yet Lord Mulgrave's 6 counsel did not
advise him to search the vessel to the keel. That can only be done
in special cases, in the presence of public officials, and in others by
an express decree of the judge, who is bound to hear both sides on
the point."
This passage, written by an eminent-prize judge, is consistent with
all the cases, all the contemporaneous text-books, and all the facts of
history. Again and again in Lord Stowell's decisions do we find
absolute injunctions against "breaking bulk" 7 ; and evidently it was
considered as a gross'piece of presumption on the part of officers, and
one likely to lead to all kinds of abuse. In particular, it deprived the
court of that thorough control over the proceedings which it was
always careful to assert." Even to land cargo was -objectionable.
"He landed the bullion,--if this had been done in the ordinary course
of prize, and whilst any cause was depending on it, it would have been
a great irregularity."9
Much less was breaking bulk permitted. Captors might play all sorts
of tricks with the cargo if it were allowed.10
Mimoire justificatif de Ia conduite de la Grande Britagne en arr tant les
navires itrangers et les munitions de guerre -destinies aux insurgens de I'Amir-
ique. Londres, 1779. See note 22 infra.
The captor.
'The L'Eole (i8o5) 6 C.'Rob. 22o, 225; The Washington (i8o6) id. 275, 280;
The Concordia (1799) 2 C. Rob. lo2.
8 Note that to search for papers was not so much objected to if it could be done
without disturbing cargo. The Atalanta (i8o8) 6 C. Rob. "44o. Cf. The Anna
Maria, note 4, supra.
*The Princessa (1799)'2 C. Rob. 31, 39.
"We. may add to the cases in note 7 from C. Rob. The San Joan Bapista
Inner Temple folio records of Prize Appeals (formerly Dr. Lushington's) Vol.
i8oo-i8o5, fo. 453, where the Euphrosyne had taken specie and jewels out of the
captured ship, and taken them to the Cape, where they were condemned. The
Lords restored them with costs.
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A typical case is The Washington," where Sir W. Scott, insisting
that "bulk shall not be broken," refused to consider that a proper
and convenient port to which to carry a prize, where the vessel could
not enter without unloading.
"If there is not depth of water to allow [the] vessel to lie without
taking out the cargo, 'non erit his locus'; since captors are not to
meddle with the cargo in any manner, without the authority of the
court, which cannot be exercised until the vessel has been brought
into port."' 2
Ortolan s defines the "droit de visite," which he identifies with the
English "right of visit and search," as "le droit de monter i bord,
d'exiger l'exhibition des papiers en usage, et d'y procdder . un examen
plus ou moins minitieux." The exercise of the right, he points out,
is an act neither of authority nor of jurisdiction. Heffter14 says that
the last formality of "visit" is the inspection of the ship's papers.
There is, indeed, a current of purely theoretical opinion running from
Vattel to Ortolan and Calvo, which makes the impractical concession
of allowing captors to rummage if there are circumstances of great
suspicion. This indulgence to the suspicions which captors will never
be slow to entertain is unknown alike to English doctrine and to
immemorial practise.
Nor, it is believed, is there in fact a single case in the reports of
the classical period, where search in the sense of rummaging is
reported as revealing an impeachable cargo, or one not corresponding
with the bills of lading.
The recent practise of bringing a ship in, and then making up one's
mind whether to proceed or not, was attempted in Sir W. Scott's day
in The Wilhelinsberg.'5 It was not carried to the extreme of omitting
to commence prize proceedings until the captors had satisfied them-
selves, but it took the form of commencing proceedings, and attempt-
ing to repudiate responsibility for the detention by offering to release
unconditionally when it became clear that process would be unsuc-
cessful. As Scott put it,
"To release a vessel in this summary manner without her consent,
after she was once brought in, would be contrary to the directions of
the Prize Act."
'Supra, note 7, at p. 277; see also p. 280.
"In the same case, Sir W. Scott expressed a strong opinion that Shetland or
S. Kilder would not be "convenient ports" when proceedings were to take place
in London. Jersey was allowed in the case of Jersey privateers. Cf. The Wil-
liamsberg (1804) 5 C. Rob. 143 (Shetland).
2 Rigles internationales et diploinatie de la mer (1856) 250.
"Das europaische vilkerrecht (1888) sec. i69.
" Supra, note 12, at p. 144.
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The real reason why ships to-day are brought in and not rummaged
at sea is not for greater convenience in rummaging, because they
cannot be, and never were, rummaged until formally charged and
the risk of costs incurred. It is for the better collection of evidence
(including its collection by unauthorized and improper rummaging);
vulgarly, for the getting up of a case.
In the old days a case was never "got up" against a ship or
goods, for the simple reason that the cause had to be tried on certain
fixed evidence. That consisted in (i) every particle of written
matter to be found on the ship, and (2) the answers of selected
members of the ship's company to certain set interrogatories. The
only thing resembling the "getting up of a case," was the getting
at these standard witnesses.
This brings us to our second head.
Captor's evidence was never allowed. It is equally clear on the
authorities that captors were never listened to. Nothing is more
puzzling to the modern lawyer, but nothing is more certain. As has
been said by Wheaton, Story, Twiss, and Phillimore, it is a great
mistake to import into the administration of prize law the methods
and doctrines of the common law. In fact, Story says that " no pro-
ceedings can be more unlike."
16  A prize cause is not a contest
between two equally matched parties, contending about some cause
of quarrel. It is a process by which an officer of one state claims to
seize and confiscate from under a friendly flag, the property of
citizens of another. He is required, therefore, to prove his case up
to the hilt. He is not allowed to adduce evidence of his own; he
must prove his case by the admissions of the other side. It is not
in the least like the theory of an action at law. It is- not even like
the theory of a criminal prosecution. We have not, in a prize case,
a tournament between two contending suitors, an attack which must
be parried if sufficiently damning. We have an extraordinary and
most delicate claim which no amount of evidence can support, if it
is not the admission of the party attacked. And this is always
forgotten to-day.
As the writer observed in I9IO,1
"Sir Travers Twiss wrote, some forty years ago, in the Law Maga-
zine'8 an article which remains a classical authority on the nature of
prize courts. He showed how modem jurists, with little experience
of maritime war, misapprehended the nature of prize suits; and how
" Citing (2) Halleck, International Law (3d ed. 1893) ch. 32, sec. 2o.
' The Inadequacy of Litigation as a Protection against Cruisers, in the Report
of gzp, Conference of the rnternational Law Association. London, 191r.
(1877) 3 LAW MAGAZINE AxD REvmW, i. Cf. Evarts. Brief in the Springbok
Case, reprinted in the present writer's Prize Law of Continuous Voyage (Lon-
don, 19x5).
FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIZE LAW
mistaken they were in taking it for granted that the ordinary prin-
ciples of municipal evidence and procedure were naturally applicable
to them. On the contrary, the admission of proof and counter-probf,
with success awarded to the strongest case, is totally foreign to prize
cases. The ship must be brought, by her own showing, within certain
plain rules; and then she is condemned, unless, as a matter of grace,
'further proof' is allowed her to excuse herself."
This doctrine of judgment on admissions is again clear on the
authorities. The celebrated Memorandum of Lee, Paul, Ryder, and
Murray,"9 states shortly and plainly:-
"The evidence to acquit or condemn, with or without costs and dam-
ages, must in the first instance come merely from the ship taken, viz:
the papers on board and the examination on oath of the master and
other principal officers; for which purpose there are officers of the
Admiralty in all the considerable seaports of every maritime power"
0
at war to examine the captains and other principal officers of every
ship brought in as prize, upon general and impartial interrogatories.21
If there do not appear from thence ground to condemn as enemy's
property or contraband goods going to the enemy, there -must be
an acquittal: -unless from the aforesaid evidence the property shall
appear so doubtful, that it is reasonable to go into further proof
thereof."
The Memorandum, which was afterwards communicated by Sir
W. Scott and Sir J. Nicholl to the United States Courts through Mr.
Jay, and forms the basis of American, as of British, prize law, gqes
on to show that where there is doubt on the primary evidence, the
claimants may as a favor, be allowed to adduce "further proof";
and of course the captors may be admitted to contradict this. The
case then assumes the aspect of an ordinary trial, but an indispensable
preliminary to such an event is something wrong with the primary
evidence-some deficiency or discrepancy in the papers or the state-
ments of the crew.
The Lee-Murray Memorandum was prepared in 1753. In 1779
Sir J. Marriott composed a Memoire justificatif. He states the same
rule as in full force.
"Ex ore tuo te judicabo. Dans le cas de t'Hendric et Alide, Milord
Mulgrave ayant trouv6 i bord des pavilions anglois, demandait au
maitre d'oii venoient ces pavilions, et pourquoi il les avoit. Klok
r6pondit que ces pavillons &oit clans le dit vaisseau lorsque Ic%
propri6taires en firent l'acquisition. Nous n'avons cependant pas
permis l'examen personnel de milord Mulgrave. Le t6moignage des
capteurs n'est admis dans ces procedures que dans les singuli&res,
' (1753). Reprinted ibid. Lee was Judge of the Prize Court, Paul, Ryder,
and Murray (afterwards Lord Mansfield) were Advocate-General, Attorney-Gen-
era?, and Solicitor-General respectively.
'9Note these three words. "Printed in r C. Rob. 381.
"See note 5, supra.
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tels que seroient le ddfaut de t6moignage de la perte de l'quipage du
vaisseau saisi, leur fuite, ou le refus obstin6 de subir un examen l6gal.
Les articles 3, 4, 5 de l'ordonnance de la marine franqaise, I68I,
portent le m~me exception.
"Si les saisis confessent que le navire appertient aux ennemis,
l'affaire est d6cid6e. Mais s'ils laissent entrevoir des prevarications
ou qu'ils se contredisent-si le t6moignage des papiers est en opposi-
tion aux t~moignages vendus de vive voix; si les documens ont 6t6
spoli~s, submerg6s, brfils, d~chir6s, ou detruits de quelque mani~re
que ce soit; si ces documens ne sont pas parfaitement clairs, ou
portent l'empreinte de l'6quivoque que l'on ne doit pas attendre d'un
voyage de bonne foi-voilA des soupqons graves; et ces d6fauts
prenant leur source originelle dans le r~clamateur m~me, n~gligeant
ou pr~varicateur, sont plus que suffisants en justice, pour qu'il soit
condamn6 aux frais de procedure qu'il A occasionn6s, quand meme
on lui vendroit le vaisseau et sa cargaison.
"Ces procedures s'accordent sans doute avec celles de le cour
d'amiraut6 de leurs Hautes Puissances 23  "
Again,
"Les capteurs qui ne seroient pas justifi6s, par le t6moignage re~me
des saisis, seroient condamn6s aux frais et aux d6dommagements, et
m~me i des punitions graves."
Sir W. Scott acted on the same principles twenty years later, and
so did Dr. Lushington half a century afterwards. Scott remarks that
the rule
"is the very essence of prize law: it is a great mistake to admit the
common-law notions in respect to evidence, to prevail in proceedings
which have no analogy to those at common law. . . . It is of the
last importance to preserve the most rigid exactness as to the admission
of evidence."
And in The Haabet he adds,
"The general rule of law . . . is, that, on all points, the evi-
dence of the claimants alone shall be received in the first instance;
and if no doubt arises on that view of the case, the court is bound . . .
to take those points as fully demonstrated. . . . If I should accede
to this demand, the consequence would be that I must do it upon a
uniform principle of admitting affidavits universally and in all cases,
though there should be nothing to excite suspicion in the original
evidence, and though the language of all the witnesses is as precise
as possible. I can come to no such conclusion. . . . For how could
the court decide? Counter affidavits must be introduced, which would
necessarily be contradictory. Which should the court believe? Can
it be maintained that preference should be given to the captors, and
that in oppositi.on to the general rule of law which has given the
preference the other way, and which directs that the property of the
neutral claimant shall not be cohdemned except on evidence coming
out of his own mouth, or arising out of the clear circumstances of
NWerlandaises.
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the transaction? If this rule is unsatisfactory to captors, it is neverthe-
less the rule which the law prescribes. It is my duty to take care
that the rules of law are observed, and that the rights of war are not
exceeded; and certainly in no cases more than in this particular branch
of the law of nations, which must in its nature operate with severe
restraint .upon neutral commerce."24
Story remarks on the irregularity of admitting extraneous evi-
dence,2 and Lushington cogently observes,
"The admission would occasion delay, expense, and doubt. There is
always difficulty in deciding between conflicting affidavits. How
enormously would that difficulty be enhanced when the affidavits come
from persons all interested in the result, and for the most part pre-
pared abroad, and from translations also !"
French practise was perfectly conformable,2' and so was Dutch.2 T
In short, the captor brings the merchant's property to the country,
but it would be going too far to force him to come himself as well
with a cloud of witnesses to defend it. The essence of prize pro-
ceedings is simplicity. The introduction of complicated cross-evidence
is foreign to it. It is contrary to mercantile security and national
honor to admit such evidence, and to enable every belligerent cruiser
to force neutrals to an expensive trial. In The Sarah28 Scott remarked,
"The practise of the court would be led away from the simplicity of
prize proceedings, and there would be no end to the accumulation
of proof that would be introduced in order to support arbitrary
suggestions."
Simplicity was not desired for its sweet sake alone, but because
neutrals would not in the long run stand being driven to sustain their
rights against cruisers by the long and expensive process of witness
trials as though they were subject to the belligerent's ordering juris-
diction. His right was extraordinary, and it was not to be enforced
by the ordinary means which he would invoke as against his own
subjects.
The system elaborated in the 17th and i8th centuries, and thus
expounded, proceeded on the view that ships were, in the energetic
language which prevailed at that time and which has been held in
more recent days by so great authorities as Daniel Webster, Lord
"Giertsen, master (18o5) 6 C. Rob. 54, 55, 57 if.
The Dos Hainanos (1817) 2 Wheat. 81.
'Ordonnance de la Marine (I6gi) Art. 24, 25, and passim.
= Cf. The Hurtige Hane (I8oi) 3 C. Rob. 324, 326, note. "Les vaisseaux et
marchandises neutres seront ausi confisquez, quand it constera par les lettres de
cargaison, . . . ou autres documens, qu'ils ont ete chargez dans les ports de
Flandres, ou qu'ils sont destinez d'y aller..." (Resolutions of the States-
General regarding blockade, June 26, 163o).
'a (I8OI) 3 C. Rob. 330, 331.
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Chancellor Lyndhurst, and Count Cavour,
29 "territory," and that a
forcible interference with ships or goods under the protection of the
national flag was not a mere matter for trial, but was required to
proceed on the plainest and most obvious principles of justice.
W¥e seem to have moved far from that position now. The-sinking
of the American ship W. P. Frye by the Germans in 1915 was received
with much more philosophic, calm than the removal of two gentlemen
from the Trent was in 1862. The removal of military Turks from
the British ship Africa by Italians in 1911 was received with no
emotion at ill; in fact, nobody noticed it. The inviolability of the
national flag has passed from the public consciousness. The sanctity
and independence of national vessels and their freedom in principle
from all foreign interference seems entirely to have- slipped into
oblivion. Ortolan's eloquent panegyric on the spirit which animates a
ship's company from captain to cabin-boy and presents it to the
stranger as a united, impenetrable whole, is pathetically out of date.
Perhaps it is because we have come to look at a ship as a mere money-
making implement; perhaps because the perils of the sea are fewer
than in the days of pirate and cockle-shell.
Or perhaps--dare it be hinted?-because cosmopolitanism has
sapped the foundations of national pride. One is not certain in spite
of the great demonstrations of willingness to incur every sacrifice in
order to make the world safe, that this is not the correct explanation.
Anyhow we no longer seem to think that the forcible capture and
confiscation of our ships touches us very closely. It seems to be
thought a matter which may well be left to the tedious and harassing
processes of the common law. But after all a great deal more than
national sentiment is concerned.
It is seldom indeed-Professor Montague Bernard thought it liardly
ever happened-that an owner whose ship or .goods are detained
receives anything like fair indemnity. Costs and damages are seldom
awarded, and if awarded are nothing like adequate to reimburse the
claimant for his trouble and anxiety, not to speak of out-of-pocket
expetses. Under the irregular and improper new practise of detain-
ing before proceedings are commenced in the hope of discovering-
evidence -by irregular rummaging and the usual detective methods,
there seems no possibility of obtaining costs and damages at all:
first, because there is no process wherein to prove for their allowance,
and secondly, because in most if not all cases the detention would
be'regarded as justified. If we once grant that a case is to be tried
on all kinds of extraneous suspicions, we must concede that there are
few cases in which suspicions might not fairly be alleged. Mental
security -vanishes; every neutral ship may be forced to justify herself
at her own expense.
* See Lawrence, Visit and Search, 182; 48 British State Papers, 428 ("The-
Cagliari, on the high seas, was a fragment of Piedmontese territory").
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As we have seen, the claimant is at a disadvantage. He is more or
less at the mercy of the court.30 He lives far away; his language and
ideas may be entirely alien; he will certainly incur heavy costs and
delays if he is forced to a common-law trial. The Memorandum
provides a fair and just substitute; let him be judged out of his own
mouth. Say its authors with all the weight of their unrivalled
experience,
"In this method all captains at sea were tried during the last war, by
Great Britain, France, and Spain, and submitted to by the neutral
powers. In this method, by courts of admiralty acting according to
the law of nations and particular treaties all captains at sea have
immemorially been judged of in every country of Europe. Any other
method of trial would be manifestly unjust, absurd, and impracticable."
Yet our modem luminaries have not hesitated to adventure to
practise strange methods. By Rule 15(2) of the Prize Court Rules
made in 1914 under statutory authority, but not with the advantage
of legislative discussion,
"a cause for the condemnation of a ship [or goods81 ] other than a
ship [or goods] of war shall be heard upon the following evidence:
c . .(d) the evidence given at the hearing, of any witnesses,
whether on behalf of the captors or of any other party.
"(e) such further evidence, if any, as may be admitted by the
Judge."
This is to assimilate the practise completely and formally to that
of a common-law trial. Discovery, that process which, as Lord
Justice Smith once said, has "made law to stink in the nostrils of
business men," is introduced wholesale by rules 9(1-7). Claimants
have been driven-to give security for costs like any foreign plaintiff in
an ordinary suit; and it is believed that Evans, P., required neutrals
to give security for f15o before they could be admitted to claim their
own property. We compare unfavorably with 1799, when Scott finely
said,
"It is not a thing becoming the justice of this country that the subjects
of other states should be put to inconvenience about the recovery of
their property . . . to answer purposes of British convenience."
32
In short, prize law doctrines have been completely submerged.
This was very natural; common lawyers cannot be expected to
appreciate the fact that there are other methods of trial differing
toto caelo from their own. But it is none the less unfortunate.
"Cf. the writer's Britain and Sea Law, 62.
" By a preposterous interpretation clause [1 (2)] "ship" includes "goods" and
"freight."
" The Concordia (1799) 2 C. Rob. io, io3.
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The whole theory of the new and revolutionary practise is in accord
with the tendency to further the interests of the belligerents. The
conception of continuous voyage requires captors' evidence to make it
effective. The pathetic plea of belligerents, that railways have turned
the ports of neutrals into ports of the enemy (forgetting that steam
cruisers have enormously increased the difficulties of contrabandists
and blockade-runners), is met at once by a melting concession of
liberty to suppress the trade of all neutral ports& The wail that a
country cannot now be hermetically sealed (a wail which ignores or
forgets the fact that it never could be) is met by an indulgence to
be a universal nuisance. The desire to force merchants to the delays,
difficulties, and expense of contested trials is met by a bland "Nothing
more proper! How else can a case be tried?"
These concessions would never be made if a weak belligerent were
in question. It is perfectly certain that great maritime countries will
not in future submit to have their ports and commerce held up by a
minor power.3 3 So that we have the very regrettable conclusion that
the law is what the strong choose to make it. The only escape is to
regard the complaisance of neutrals in the late struggle as their way
of giving limited assistance to the forces of right and justice. Thus
regarded, the encroachments on neutral rights would be exceptional,
and like the fulminations of Napoleon and the British Cabinet in 18o6,
they would fail to serve as precedents for the future.
As Puffendorf put it at an earlier day,34
"Those princes wisely judge that it would not become them to take
precipitate measures, whilst other nations are combining their whole
force to reduce within bounds an insolent and exorbitant power which
threatens Europe with slavery."
The words of Sir W. Scott are entirely applicable:
"The nature of the present war does give this country the rights
of war, relatively to neutral states, in as large a measure as they have
been regularly and legally exercised at any period of modern and
civilized times. I leave it to the judgment of Europe whether I
estimate the nature of the war justly, when I declare that I consider
this as a war in which neutral states themselves have an interest
much more direct and substantial than they have in the ordinary,
limited, and private quarrels . . . of Great Britain and its great
public enemy."
Such considerations cannot alter the rights of neutrals, however they
may affect their complaisance.
Because railways have facilitated transit-and railways are expen-
sive and easily congested-it is absurd to invest belligerents with a
" See Van Houten's observations in (1917) 3 Recueil des Rapports, 59 (Orga-
nization pour une Paix Durable, La Haye).
' Cited in The Maria (1799) 1 C. Rob. 340, 352.
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universal inquisitorial power, as well as with fast cruisers which can
catch anything.
Nothing, in fact, .is so remarkable as the apathetic levity with which
the facile excuse of "railways" is put forward to cover the very
gravest interference with the commerce of neutral states. It is hardly
denied that, rightly or wrongly, the allied maritime policy of 1915
amounted practically to a prohibition of neutral trade with the enemy.
Was it necessary merely because of railways, to put the world back
into Queen Elizabeth's days in this regard? The merest tyro in
affairs would suppose that before such a momentous decision was
taken, the true effect of railway facilities would be carefully inves-
tigated, and some attempt made to estimate the effect of the increased
facilities upon blockade. Yet not the slightest detailed attempt was
made; the world shot blindfold into anarchy dispensed from "juridical
niceties."
Even had the effect been ascertained to be considerable, it may be
doubted whether the necessary outcome would have been to invest
belligerents with fresh powers. A very substantial offset in their favor
is afforded by the modern fast cruiser, which is incomparably more
effective against the freighter than the frigate was against the
merchantman. An eminent British judge, Lord Kingsdown, regarded
it as much more than an offset. According to Halleck,
"two or three steam vessels may be as effective now as twenty sailing
vessels were formerly."
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But even if the belligerents' power were impaired (the writer inclines
to think it has been, on balance, increased) it 'by no means follows
that means must not be devised to restore it. Some countries were
always difficult to blockade in comparison with others; there was
never any idea of adding an additional handicap to equalize matters!
If a country was an awkward one to blockade, or became such, that
was its luck and the would-be blockader's misfortune. Law is not
designed to correct the defects of geography. And if science steps
in to render blockades more difficult, it might well be argued that it
is not the province of law to correct the indiscretions of science.
It must always be a grave and urgent matter for a nation to find
its ports rendered useless. Such a measure must always put consider-
able stress upon it. A country cannot, and never would, be her-
metically sealed, and the mere quantum of less or more which filters
into it from overland sources cannot affect the principle. Sir W.
Scott said in The Stort, 3
32 International Law (Baker's ed. igo8) ch. 25, sec. 7. Cf. also Preface to
Prize Law and Continuous Voyage, supra, note x8.
N (So) 4 C. Rob. 65, 67.
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"The commerce, though partially open, is still subject to a pressure
of difficulties and inconvenience. To cut off the power of immediate
export and importation from the ports of Holland is of itself no
insignificant operation."
The law of blockade cannot be altered because certain blockades have
become difficult. Had blockade, for some reason, become everywhere
or generally inefficacious, it would be time to discuss the provision of
a working substitute. But as long as the closure of ports drives a
belligerent to fall back on congested and enormously expensive rail-
road transit, it cannot be dismissed as a measure devoid of menace.
At the very least, the basic facts ought to be examined before dis-
missing "juridical" considerations to Saturn.
Sir W. Scott's felicitous language may again be adopted, 37
"I am not ignorant that amongst the loose doctrines which modern
fancy, under the vafious denominations of philosophy and philan-
thropy, and I know not what, has thrown upon the world, it has
been within these few years advanced, or rather insinuated, that
'changes are necessary.' Upon such unauthorized speculations it is
not necessary for me to descant. The law and practise of nations .-..
give them no sort of countenance; and until that law and practise
are new-modelled in such a way as may surrender the known and
ancient rights of some nations to the present convenience of other
nations, (which nations may perhaps remember to forget them, when
they happen to be themselves [neutrals]) no reverence is due to
them. . . . If it were fit that such a [changed] state should be
introduced, it is at least necessary that it should be introduced in an
avowed and intelligible manner, and not in a way which, professing
gravely to adhere to that system which has for centuries prevailed
among civilized states, and urging at-the same time a pretension
utterly inconsistent with all its known principles, delivers over the
whole matter at once to eternal controversy and conflict, at the expense
of the constant hazard of the harmony of states, and of the lives and
safeties of innocent individuals."
Nor is the plea that a proper and orthodox blockade is impossible
in these days of submarines a valid one. It is conclusively answered
by the fact that in actuality very few cargoes did penetrate the British
maritime cordon. An orthodox blockade might therefore with perfect
propriety have been declared of the German North Sea ports. The
drawback was that it was impossible legally to blockade the Baltic
ports; and in order virtually to blockade them the extraordinary
system of an extended list of contraband coupled with an arrogation
of power to stop it on its way to neutral ports was devised.
It is not proposed here to elaborate the criticism of this system which
the present writer has elsewhere ventured, on purely academic grounds,
to put forward. It is desired, however, to emphasize that it is of one
texture with the bringing in of ships while a case is got up against
"The Maria, supra, note 34, at p. 362 ff.
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them, and with the wholesale admission of captors' evidence-which
are things utterly repudiated in the past, and deserving of like
reprobation in the future.
At any rate, those. who believe that neutrals in general deserve, and
in the long run will obtain, more sympathy from the world than
belligerents, will so conclude. That there will be neutrals and bel-
ligerents in the future as in the past, -is a further proposition which
it is not for us here to argue or to raise.
We had thought, since the Declaration of Paris, and as late as the
year 19oo, that the trend of the world's opinion was against the
belligerent and in favor of the neutral. The disquiet caused by the
"continuous voyage" decisions-very few in number-was allayed
by the reflection that the overwhelming current of opinion was to
discourage belligerency as a nuisance to the world's highways. The
Russian pretensions of 19o4-5 shook this complacency. The feeble
manner in which neutral statesmen handled the problems presented
by the Russian action greatly increased the sense of insecurity. The
belligerent, though a nuisance, was seen to be allowed to have much
of his own way, his pretensions were admitted to have as much weight
as time-honored precedent to the contrary. The result,38 due to a
long period of peace and forgetfulness, has 'been to reduce neutral
immunities to the vanishing-point. There could be no better illustra-
tion of the cardinal maxim of politics,
"The price of our liberties is eternal vigilance."
'As, the present writer may, be excused from observing, was predicted in a
paper entitled The Recrudescence of Belligerent Pretensions, read at Christiania
in i9o5.
